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The Illusion of Fairness Through 
- 
Special Committees in Management 
Buyouts* 
Shelby D. Green** 
Special committees of corporate directors are in vogue as the instru- 
ments to ensure fairness in management buyouts of their companies. 
Committees of directors, of course, are not new to corporate boards and 
most large publicly-held corporations maintain standing committees to 
handle a wide range of routine matters. Similarly, ad hoc or special com- 
mittees have long-existed to address discrete, non-recurring questions. 
But the use of special committees on management buyout proposals as a 
response to questions of conflict of interest is excessive. 
Consider the recent case of Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. ' 
There, several members of the management of Macmillan proposed a 
leveraged buyout of the company; a deal bringing shareholders billions of 
dollars, but also bringing their elimination from the Macmillan enter- 
p r i ~ e . ~  To convince shareholders that this would be a fair deal, the board 
set up a special committee of dire~tors .~ As a 'safeguard' (the end of 
which should be obvious) the chairman of the board handpicked the 
members.4 The chairman further offered the committee the able assist- 
ance and insight of the retained investment advisors that had crafted the 
management buyout prop~sal .~  
* Copyright O 1990 by Shelby D. Green. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University, Ft. Lauderdale, 
Florida, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.; B.S., Towson State College, 
Baltimore, Maryland. 
1. 559 A.2d 1261 @el. 1989). 
2. Id at 1265-66. In a leveraged buyout, the purchaser acquires the company's outstanding 
stock from the shareholders. An investment banker arranges the transaction and the financing for 
the purchase. Management stays in control of the company and eventually repays the debt to the 
investors. The corporation's assets are normally used as collateral for the funds for the acquisition. 
See Fradkin v. Emst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 833 @. Ohio 1976). In Macmillan, certain members of 
management joined with the investment banking 6rm of Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts in the buyout. 
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264. 
3. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1267. 
4. Id at 1267. 
5. Id at 1268. 
161 
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For a while it seemed as though the chairman's strategy would work 
as the committee repeatedly rejected the bids of another suitor for the 
~ o m p a n y . ~  Even when the other suitor bid $80 per share, all cash, and 
the management team bid $64.15 ($52.35 in cash with the balance in 
subordinated securities), the special committee was able to convince itself 
that the management bid was higher.' 
In the shareholder suit that followed the special committee's deci- 
sion was condemned.' It must be clear that a committee so composed is 
unlikely to reach a decision that is fair to shareholders. However, it 
seems the issue is larger than the corruption of one committee. This case 
exposes the inherent deficiencies of the 'special committee' device as a 
treatment for conflict of interest problems. 
This essay will explore these deficiencies and argue for real, and not 
illusory, safeguards against directors' self-dealing in management 
buyouts. Part I1 provides an overview of corporation law regarding the 
decisionmaking authority of the board. Part I11 discusses self-dealing 
transactions as exceptions to the normal judicial deference accorded 
board decisions. Part IV discusses the flaws in the use of the special 
committee to address conflict of interest problems. Part V provides an 
analysis of the case introducing this essay and Part VI offers conclusions 
and suggestions for reform. 
In considering the role played by special committees in management 
leveraged buyouts, some basic principles of corporate decisionmaking 
should be stated. The relevant Delaware statute expresses the concept 
well: "The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be man- 
aged by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .''9 In exercis- 
ing this discretion directors must use reason and act as ordinarily 
prudent persons under similar circumstances, or be liable in damages to 
the c~rporation.'~ It is not enough, though, that directors act without 
0 
- 
6. Id at 1270-71. 
7. Id. at 1271. 
8. Id. at 1278. 
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 141(a) (1988). The corporation statutes of other states contain 
similar wording. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 8 8.01(b) (1984): "All corporate pow- 
ers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the 
articles of incorporation." See also N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 5 701 (McKinney 1989): "[Tlhe business 
of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors . . . ." 
10. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT Q 8.30 (1984) provides: 
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as director, including his duties as a member of a 
committee: 
(1) in good faith; 
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negligence as the discretion and duty to manage demands the good faith 
and honesty of directors. As Judge Cardozo once stated, "[nlot honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is , . . the standard 
of behavior" required of corporate fiduciaries." While these two fiduci- 
ary duties set the contours for management, the law nonetheless gives 
directors a large measure of discretion in decisionmaking. 
This position finds its true expression in the "business judgment 
rule": 
[A] court will not interfere with the judgment of the board of directors 
unless there is a showing of gross and palpable overreaching. A board 
of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment and its 
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational 
purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own 
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.'* 
The rule constitutes a presumption that in making a business decision, 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of 
the company. l3 
The policies underlying the business judgment rule were well-stated 
in Auerbach v. Bennett:14 
[Tlhe business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the 
prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called 
on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments. 
The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by 
statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably 
there can be no available objective standard by which the correctness 
of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or 
otherwise. l5 
Since directors cannot be expected to make competent and dynamic deci- 
sions if confronted each time with the certainty of hindsight, the rule 
promotes efficiency in corporate decisionmaking.16 
Given the broad grant of authority to manage and the great defer- 
ence to the directors' considered business judgment, it follows that the 
board has the power to delegate specific authority to a committee of di- 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
11. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E 545, 546 (1928). 
12. Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 @el. 1971) (citation omitted). However, there is 
no protection for directors who have made an "unintelligent or unadvised judgment." Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
13. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
14. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
15. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926. 
16. See Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigation Society, 15 
VAL. U.L. REV. 49, 54 (1980). 
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rectors1' and that the business judgment rule should protect a decision of 
that committee. l 8  
The business judgment rule indeed affords directors wide latitude in 
the operation of the enterprise, but it has only limited application in self- 
dealing transactions. At early common law transactions between corpo- 
rate fiduciaries and the corporation were treated not with deference (as 
would be the case if the business judgment rule were applicable) but by 
great court scrutiny (as with the law of trusts).I9 
Under the trust analogy managers who proposed self-dealing con- 
tracts had dual interests - their own and their interests as fiduciaries of 
the corporation. Since both could not be served in the same decision it 
was idle to demand sublimation of this conflict. The common law thus 
demanded avoidance of these conflicts.20 
Since self-dealing transactions, the clearest example of a conflict be- 
tween duty and self-interest, threaten the ~orporation,~' the rule of law 
17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 141(c) (1988): 
The board . . . may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or 
more committees . . . . Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the 
board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the 
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and 
affairs of the corporation . . . . 
18. The decision by the board to delegate decisionmaking to a committee or to an outsider is 
unquestionably a matter of business judgment. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 @el. 1986); 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
19. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The court explained: 
While technically not trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary rela- 
tion to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, 
and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has estab- 
lished a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director. . . the most scrupulous obser- 
vance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation 
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing hything that would work injury to 
the corporation . . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest . . . . If 
an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his duty . . . acquires gain or advan- 
tage for himself, the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of the 
corporation, at  its election . . . . [This rule is] inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity 
. . . .  
'I 
See ahro Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986). 
20. Id. See S. LORNE, ACOUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANS- 
ACTIONS, § lA.O2[2][a] (1989). ' 
21. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Eflciency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 738, 759-60 (1978). The-author stat&: 
In a fiduciary relationship, the client or beneficiary depends on the fiduciary to an 
unusual degree to determine for the client what his best interests are. Given this disparity 
of experience, it would be extremely difficult and costly for the client to draft a detailed 
contract defining the duties of fiduciary. 
Fiduciary duties economize on transaction costs by simply obliging the fiduciary to act 
in the best interests of his client or beneficiary and to refrain from self-interested behavior 
not specifically allowed by the employment contract. They codify the reasonable expecta- 
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that developed was that these transactions were disqualified not only 
from the protection of the business judgment rule, but also were voidable 
at the instance of the corporation or shareholders, without regard to the 
fairness or unfairness of the transaction or the disinterestedness of the 
directors who approved it.22 As one early case explains: 
It is among the rudiments of the law that the same person cannot 
act for himself and at the same time, with respect to the same matter, 
as agent for another, whose interests are conflicting . . . The two posi- 
tions impose different obligations, and their union would at once raise 
a conflict between interest and duty; and 'constituted as humanity is, in 
the majority of cases, duty would be overborne in the struggle'. . . . 23 
Modem corporation statutes reflect a recognition of a need to fash- 
ion different rules for this kind of fiduciary relationship and generally 
permit such transactions. Statutes provide that self-dealing transactions 
are not void or voidable solely because of the conflict of interest if the 
transaction is: 1) disclosed and approved by a disinterested board; 2) dis- 
closed and approved by the shareholders; or 3) is found to be fair to the 
corp~ra t ion .~~  Despite their apparent breadth, conflict of interest stat- 
tions of the client, by obliging the fiduciary to do what the client would tell him to do if the 
client had the same expertise as the fiduciary. 
Id. 
Ballantine points out that the early cases held, "[iln fiduciary relationships, . . . the one upon 
whom the principal relies for representation and protection is not permitted to bargain with him at 
arm's length or to set up immunity for sharp practices under a claim of the bargaining privilege of 
caveat emptor." H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 167 (1946). 
22. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? - ConJicr of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. 
LAW. 35,36-43 (1966); see a h  Note, "Interested Director's" Contracts - Section 713 of the New York 
Business Corporation Law and the "Fairness" Test, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 640-41 (1973). 
23. Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880). Therefore, in Wardell, the court 
held that it was improper for directors to make arrangements to secure an advantage for themselves 
by the formation of a new company as an auxiliary to the original one, with an understanding that 
they or some of them would take stock in it, and then that valuable contracts would be given to it. 
Id. 
This rigid prohibition against selfdealing seemed to have unquestionable validity in the trust 
relationship where conservatism in the application of the trust res is the controlling principle and 
trustee powers are in large measure derived from and limited by the trust instrument. 
Corporate fiduciary relationships, however, seemed to require a more flexible approach. It was 
Ballantine's theory that while directors are fiduciaries, they possess great, even original, power. H. 
BALLANTINE, supra note 21, at 4-5, 133, 167-68; see a h  People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 
194, 200-01, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); Hoyt v. Thompson's Executors, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859). 
It has been argued that because the nature of the entity requires a certain dynamism in the 
application of corporate resources, the rules governing trustees (guardians, executors or administra- 
tors, agents, partners, promoters) and directors should not necessarily coincide. Id. Ballantine 
states further that although a high standard of loyalty must be demanded of directors, it might not 
be wise policy to restrict them to the same extent as trustees and agents. Id. Indeed, some have 
argued that selfdealing may be more beneficial than "comparable otherdealing, or market, transac- 
tions." R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 164 (1986). Others have suggested that conflicts of interest 
are the inevitable result of engaging in specialized exchange and since efficiency requires reliance on 
the specialized production of goods and services and on an extensive system of exchange to make 
goods and services available to those who need them, some conflicts of interest are unavoidable. See 
Anderson, supra note 21, at 739. 
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 144 (1988) provides in part: 
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or 
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utes do not repudiate entirely the common law's aversion to self-dealing 
 transaction^.^^ 
Indeed, it would be absurd to argue that legislatures, in relaxing the 
rules on self-dealing, intended corporate fiduciaries to use these new rules 
to accomplish naked freeze-outs of shareholders from the co rpo ra t i~n .~~  
On the contrary, courts initially asserted continuing jurisdiction to evalu- 
ate the merits of self-dealing transactions with regard to fairnes~.~' One 
court noted, "it would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to 
hold that because the majority directors or stockholders disclose their 
purposes and interest, they may strip the corporation of its assets to their 
own financial advantage . . . ."28 This reaction seems to reflect the pre- 
vailing view that compliance with the disclosure and ratification provi- 
sions of these statutes merely "freshens the air" and removes the 
"interested director but the ultimate fairness of the transaction 
must still be proved to the satisfaction of the court.30 
officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, . . . shall be void or voidable 
solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in 
the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or 
solely because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if: 
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or trans- 
action are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board 
or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of 
a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less 
than a quorum; or 
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or trans- 
action are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the 
contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or 
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is author- 
ized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders. 
See also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 9 8.31 (1984). Thirty-eight corporate statutes have 
provisions relating to self-interest contracts. 
25. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 @.N.J. 1974); Remillard Brick Co. 
v. Remillard-Dandi Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.M 66, 74 (1952). 
26. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 730 (1985). The author 
states: 
The first management buyouts appeared about ten years ago. Then called "going private," 
most of those transactions involved small firms that had gone public in the hot new issue 
market of the late 1960's and early 1970's . . . . 
Though the supply of these small, "inadvertent" public companies has dried up since 
the early 1970's, management buyouts are still with us. But while the basic conflict of 
interest remains, management buyouts have in other respects changed considerably. . . . 
. . . .  
Real economic and social gains from these buyouts are more difficult to find. 
Id. 
27. Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 
335, 335-36 (1948). 
28. Remillard Brick Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418-19, 241 P.2d at 73-74. 
29. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 @el. 1976). Even with disclosure and approval it 
is still incumbent upon the self-dealing director to demonstrate the intrinsic fairness of the transac- 
tion. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F .  Supp. at 68. 
30. However, in a recent case decided by the Delaware Supreme Court, Marciano v. Nakash, 
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I .  ERADICATING THE THREAT HROUGH THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE 
Even under continuing judicial scrutiny these rules relieve some cor- 
porate fiduciaries of rigid common law restraints and give them the 
means to redefine their relationship with shareholders and the corpora- 
tion. Directors, top management and other fiduciaries can view them- 
selves as co-venturers, entitled to share in the rewards of the enterpri~e.~' 
The recent conduct of managers in leveraged buyouts show, though, that 
these fiduciaries are not content with sharing, but would arrogate to 
themselves the whole enterpri~e.'~ 
A board or committee decision to accept a management buyout pro- 
posal should be tested under conflict of interest  principle^.^^ However, 
some have proposed that management leveraged buyout proposals ap- 
proved by special committees of disinterested directors should be 
shielded from shareholder challenge by the business judgment rule.34 
This proposition seems to hold that a special committee, with its formal- 
535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987), some comments in dicta suggested that in certain cases a more preclusive 
effect may result from compliance with the statute. 
The court stated that disclosure and approval by the disinterested directors "permits invocation 
of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of 
proof upon the party attacking the transaction." Id. at 405 n.3. The case involved a challenge by a 
50% shareholder to the corporation's repayment of loans made to the corporation by the other 50% 
shareholder. The board of directors was hopelessly deadlocked and as such there was no disclosure 
to the board nor approval of the loans by the disinterested members. Consequently, the burden of 
proving fairness rested upon the selfdealing directors. Id. at 404-05. 
31. See Vagts, The Leveraged Buyout and Management's Share, 25 WAKE FOR= L. REV. 
129, 132 (1990). 
32. Id. See e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882,885 (6th Cir. 1986): " M e  conclude 
on the basis of strong evidence that . . . [the] Board of Directors unreasonably preferred incumbent 
management in the bidding process . . . [and] gave their colleagues on the Board, [as well as] . . . 
'inside managers' preference in the negotiations, because of 'bias.' " 
See also DeMon, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1988). The author states: 
"In recent years the level of merger and acquisition activity in the United States has been 
strikingly high, staggeringly so to some observers. . . . In 1986, 4,024 transactions with a 
value of $190,512.3 million were completed, topping the prior record set in 1985 of 3,397, 
valued at $144,283.5 million. . . . [B]y June 1987, wmpleted buyouts for the year totaled 
$34.3 billion. 
Id. 
33. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee - Ensuring Business Judgment 
Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions 
Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW. 665, 666 (1988): 
[C]ommittees allow a board to engage in an objective, disinterested examination of corpo- 
rate issues in which some or all non-committee board members are interested par- 
ties. . . .Membership in these committees is limited to so-called "independent or 
disinterested directors," who are free of any financial or other interests that would prevent 
them from exercising objective, unbiased judgment. 
34. Id. at 667. The author argues that in management buyouts and other conflict of interest 
transactions "a special committee is helpful - if not invaluable - to ensure protection under the 
business judgment rule." Id. 
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ity and apparent detachment, removes from the transaction the odium of 
self-interest. 
Judging from the number of recent cases involving special commit- 
tees used for this purpose, this proposition has many adherents among 
the ranks of boards of directors.35 In the last several years numerous 
corporate boards have taken comfort in apparent judicial approval of the 
practice by setting up special committees to evaluate leveraged buyout 
proposals.36 However, the special committee fails to accomplish the 
hoped-for result - fairness. The deficiencies are as follows. 
A. Selection and Size of Committees 
The most fundamental flaw in the selection process for members of 
special committees is that there are no governing standards. While cor- 
poration statutes give the board authority to delegate authority to com- 
mittees, the details of such delegation are left to the discretion of the 
board.37 In the case of the usual standing committees, corporate boards 
35. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), was one of the first cases to consider 
the role of the special committee in leveraged buyouts. The proposed purchaser was the controlling 
stockholder, Signal. Six of the thirteen UOP directors were elected by Signal and five of these were 
either directors or employees of Signal. Id. at 704. 
UOP's president, a director of both companies, negotiated on behalf of UOP although the nego- 
tiations were half-hearted at best. He mentioned the price on only one occasion and failed to disclose 
a Signal study indicating a willingness to accept a price higher than that on the table. Id. at 707. 
In the suit challenging the buyout, the court pointed to long-standing fiduciary principles that 
dictated that the Signal designated directors on UOP's board owed UOP and its shareholders an 
uncompromising duty of loyalty. The court stated: 
When Directors of a . . . corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to 
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bar- 
gain. The requirement of fairness is udinching in its demand that where one stands on 
both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, su5cient to 
pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. 
Id. at 710 (citations omitted). 
That burden was not met in this case. There was no attempt to structure the transaction on an 
arm's length basis. In a footnote the court ventured a view on the significance of an independent 
committee in meeting the burden of proving fairness: "although perfection is not possible, or ex- 
pected, the result here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent 
negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length." Id. at 709 n.7. 
This single footnote has prompted much reliance and litigation. See, e.g., Memtt v. Colonial 
Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Ch. 1986); but see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.M 929, 
938 @el. 1985). 
36. See genemlly In re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig., 570 A.2d 259 (Del. 1990); Rabkin v. 
Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.M 1099 (Del. 1985); In re Envirodyne Indus. Shareholders 
Litig., No. 10702, slip. op. @el. Ch. Apr. 20, 1989), reprintedin 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 175 (1990); In 
re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10598, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (1989 
WESTLAW 25812); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); In 
re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. @el. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), reprintedin 14 
DEL. J. COUP. L. 699 (1989); Rosman v. Shoe-Town, No. 9483, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1988) 
(1988 WL 3638); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., No. 9212, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987), 
reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651 (1988); In re Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8636, slip. op. (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 324 (1988); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 
11 17 (Del. Ch. 1985); Patents Management Corp. v. O'Connor, No. 71 10, slip op. @el. Ch. June 10, 
1985), reprinted in 11 DEL. J. COUP. L. 693 (1986). 
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 141(c) (Supp. 1988). 
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can refer to history and industry practice for guidance in composing and 
staffing ~ommittees.~' But the special committee in conflict of interest 
cases makes its own way.3g Recent cases reveal no discernable patterns 
or standards for the composition of such committees. In terms of size 
there have been special committees of one,40 two4' and three directors.42 
In other cases, directors become members of special committees by 
default - they are the only ones who are not financially interested in the 
matter before the ~0mrnitte.e.~~ Most often these are the outside direc- 
tors. However, the benefits derived from the objective disinterest of 
outside directors may well be overshadowed by their limited knowledge 
of the corporation's day-to-day affairs. Outside directors are almost al- 
ways executives of other companies which demand their attentions and 
leave little time to devote to the corporation's affairs.44 In recent years it 
38. Simpson, supm note 33. "A board will generally rely on standing committees, such as 
audit, compensation, and nominating committees, for recurring issues." Id. at 666. Indeed, the 
existence of such committees may be a matter of statute. Id. at 666 n.3. 
39. It is apparent that, as an ad hoc response to exigency, these committees can have little in 
the way of tradition to aid them in setting their agenda. See genemlly Simpson, supm note 33. 
40. Patents Management Corp. v. O'Connor, No. 71 10, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 10, 1985), re- 
printed in 11 DEL. J. COUP. L. 830 (1986) (a special committee composed of one outside, disinter- 
ested director and one executive officer of the corporation was appointed to consider a management 
leveraged buyout). 
41. In  re Trans World Airlines Shareholders Litig., No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), 
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP. L. 870 (1989) (a special committee composed of two board members 
was appointed to consider a leveraged buyout); I n  re Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8636, slip op. (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. COUP. L. 324 (1988) (special committee of two appointed 
to consider merger with company controlled by directors); American General Corp. v. Texas Air 
Corp., No. 8390, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 173 (1988) (a 
special committee originally consisting of two outside directors was appointed to consider a merger 
proposal and a newly added outside director subsequently joined the committee). 
42. I n  re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig., 570 A.2d 259 (Del. 1990) (special committee con- 
sisted of three directors, half the board); I n  re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10598, slip op. 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (1989 WESTLAW 25812); Shingala v. Becor Western, Inc., Nos. 8858, 
8859, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 7390); Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. 
Indus., No. 9212, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. COUP. L. 651 (1988) 
(special committee was composed of three of the eleven member board). 
43. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (special committee consisted of 
the outside directors); Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 @el. 1985) (special 
committee consisted of the outside directors); I n  re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 
770, 773 (Del. Ch. 1988) (special committee consisted of all of the outside directors); but see I n  re 
Maxxam Group, Inc., No. 8676, slip op. (Del.Ch. Apr. 16, 1987) (1987 WESTLAW 10016) (special 
committee of two where "[bloth men had been directors of Maxxam from a date preceding [the 
merger proposal] and both appear[ed] to have experience and expertise in the field of mergers and 
acquisitions"). 
44. See M. WCE,  D r u ~ c r o ~ s :  M m  AND REALITY 49,107 (1971); see also Mace, Directors: 
Myth and Reol iwTen Years Loter, 32 RUTGEM L. REV. 293 (1979). In his study of the boards of 
publicly-held corporations, Mace found: 
[clhief executives who serve other companies as directors are exceedingly busy men, 
and their carefully budgeted time schedules cannot allow substantial diversions. Devoting 
12 to 18 hours a year to the board problems of other companies does not permit any 
perceptive and meaningful understanding of company problems. And to assume that com- 
pany presidents - busy company presidents - will spend the time to do the homework 
essential to understanding company problems is asking more than should be reasonably 
expected. Their own stockholders would be short-changed if the president's time and en- 
ergy were diverted to the problems of another company. 
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has become increasingly clear that it is not even the inside directors who 
manage the corporation, but senior exec~t ives .~~ 
In terms of member incompetence, the selection process is both arbi- 
trary and biased. While members of the board are selected in part be- 
cause of their expertise in the particular industry, staffing decisions for 
special committees ignore this relevant criteria and consider only the di- 
rector's financial relationship to the matter to be decided.46 
B. Objective Disinterest 
The cases reveal that some special committees are not even ostensi- 
bly disinterested. In In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig~tion,~' a special 
committee was appointed to consider a management leveraged 
The buyout contemplated the purchase of stock owned by Ariadne, 
which amounted to 49.5% of KDI.49 Seven of nine KDI directors were 
appointed to the special corn~nittee.~~ Three of the committee members 
were also shareholders of A~iadne.~' After certain members of the spe- 
cial committee expressed concern about the presence of the Ariadne 
shareholding directors on the committee, the board reconstituted the spe- 
cial committee by making two of the three Ariadne shareholding direc- 
tors alternates and retaining one as a regular member of the ~ommittee.'~ 
The special committee then unanimously recommended approval of the 
buyout.53 
The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of KDI, claimed the special 
committee was tainted because its membership included a stockholder of 
Ariadne and Ariadne stood to benefit most from the tran~action.'~ De- 
spite what appeared to be an obvious conflict of interest the court dis- 
missed the complaint on these grounds: 
M. MACE, supra, at 107. See ako M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 146 (1971). 
45. Mace reported that, contrary to myth, the role of directors is largely advisory and not of a 
decisionmaking nature, that management managed the company and board members served as 
sources of advice and counsel to management. In most large and medium sized companies the 
boards of directors did not establish objectives, strategies and policies. These roles were performed 
by management. CEO's and directors interviewed generally agreed that only management can and 
should have these responsibilities. M. MACE, supra note 44, at 47-49 &passim; see also M. EaEN- 
BERG, supra note 44, at 140. In fact, the language of the Delaware statute contemplates the delega- 
tion of executive functions: "The business and affairs of every corporation. . . shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors. . . ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 141(a) (1988). 
46. R. CLARK, supra note 24, at 645. 
47. No. 10,278, slip. op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 759 (1989). 
48. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 761. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 762. 
52. Id. 
53. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 764. 
54. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 769. 
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First, the record indicates that Ariadne was not willing to accept less 
than fair value for its KDI stock . . . . Second, Ariadne has no finan- 
cial interest in the merger in the sense of standing on both sides of the 
transaction. Finally, Ariadne had only one representative on the Spe- 
cial Committee and there is no evidence that the Ariadne representa- 
tive dominated or controlled the other disinterested members.5s 
However, consider the decision in Greenfield v. National Medical 
Care, I ~ c . , ~ ~  where a special committee was appointed to review and 
evaluate a management leveraged buyout propo~al.~' The committee 
was composed of four  director^.^^ Three of these had no financial inter- 
est in the matter.59 The fourth, Hager, was part of a group which would 
own 25% of the common stock of the resulting c~rporation.~' Hager 
was initially paid as a consultant to the board and subsequently asked to 
join the board and allowed to purchase stock.61 Although Hager re- 
signed, his resignation did not become effective until after the committee 
recommended acceptance of the merger prop~sal.~' The court rejected a 
defense motion to dismiss, ruling: 
Although the complaint does not allege that there were any other bid- 
ders, it does allege that the merger price was unfair and that the lock- 
up prevented the stockholders from obtaining a higher offer. When 
combined with the allegations that the merger was approved by an 
interested board and that one of the members of the special committee 
was not independent, but did not resign until after the committee rec- 
ommended the merger, I conclude that the complaint sufficiently states 
a claim for breach of fiduciary 
It is interesting that the same vice-chancellor decided both In re 
KDI and Greenfield, yet the decisions seem irreconcilable. In both cases, 
the same persons (the board of directors) proposing the buyout would 
also decide the matter.64 Greenfield reflects the correct position that the 
offense of a self-dealing transaction cannot be treated by a special com- 
mittee that is itself tainted.6s 
55. Id. 
56. Nos. 7720 & 7765 (consolidated), slip op. (Del. Ch. June 6, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 737 (1987). 
57. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 741. 
58. Id. 
59. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 742. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id., reprinted in 12 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 743. 
63. Id. 
64. In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10,278, slip op. @el. Ch. Nov. 1,  1988), reprinted 
in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 759 (1989); Greenfied, Nos. 7720 & 7765 (consolidated), slip op., reprinted in 
12 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 737. 
65. Moreover, "when the persons. . . who control the making of a transaction and the fixing of 
its terms . . . are on both sides, then the presumption [of] and deference to sound business judgment 
are no longer present." David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427,430-31 (Del. Ch. 
1969). 
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C. Structural Bias 
The appointment of directors with no identifiable stake in a transac- 
tion before the committee is no guarantee of objective decisionmaking. 
Even board members recognize the existence of more subtle forces that 
may compromise a director's ~bject ivi ty .~~ In the selection of directors 
generally, one scholar, Mace, found that chief executive officers specifi- 
cally seek board members who are aligned philosophically and politically 
with management.67 Among the desirable qualifications of candidates, 
position, and title as leaders in their field are e~sen t ia l .~~  In the special 
committee cases chief executive officers assure a favorable outcome by 
choosing friendly directors and by excluding those who may be adverse 
or represent minority interests.69 
66. In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10,278, slip op. @el. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988), reprinted 
in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 759 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
67. M. MACE, supra note 44, at 98-99, 196. 
68. Id. Mace found that a director must "not be a controversial figure, and not be inclined to 
stimulate controversy with the management or with the other outside directors." Id. at 98. Rather, 
the director must be sympathetic to the management. Id. at 196. 
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Bwrdmm: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corpomte Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer, 1985, at 83, 85. The authors studied the special litigation committee and ex- 
amined "several social-psychological mechanisms that can generate bias in the directors' assessment 
of the suit, including biases established by appointment of members to the board or a special litiga- 
tion committee, control of pecuniary or nonpecuniary rewards made available to the independent 
directors by the defendant members of the board of directors, the independent directors' prior as- 
sociations with the defendants, and their cultural and social heritages." Id. at 84-85. The authors 
concluded that "these several psychological mechanisms can be expected to generate subtle, but 
powerful, biases which result in the independent directors' reaching a decision insulating colleagues 
on the board from legal sanctions." Id. at 85. 
Eisenberg has suggested that these biases arise from various compositional elements. The most 
striking is the degree to which the typical board includes persons who are economically or psycho- 
logically dependent upon or tied to the corporation's executives, particularly its chief executive: 
Recent surveys suggest, for example, that approximately one-tifth to one-fourth of the 
outside directors in large American corporations are lawyers or investment bankers. Prob- 
ably most of these are suppliers of services to the corporations on whose boards they sit, 
and are therefore highly interested in retaining the good graces of the chief executive, who 
normally has control over the purchase of such services. These surveys also indicate that 
approximately 12 to I5 percent of outside directors are commercial bankers, who are also 
often intent on retaining the wrporation's business. Many if not most of the remaining 
directors are psychologically tied to the chief executive by friendship, former colleagueship, 
or both. 
M. EISENBERG, supra note 44, at 144-46. Eisenberg's treatment of the subject was based in part 
upon Conference Board Surveys and two studies: HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, PROFILE OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS (1971) and KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS AN- 
NUAL STUDY 18 (1975). 
69. Two examples illustrate the point. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 
1261 @el. 1989), the chairman and chief executive officer who proposed a restructuring plan in 
which senior management would end up with absolute majority control handpicked the committee 
members and included a college classmate of his father as a member. In In re Ft. Howard Corp. 
Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), repriirted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 699 
(1989), the chairman of the board, who proposed the buyout, selected the special committee. He met 
with another director at an airport to ask the latter to serve as chairman and the two of them agreed 
upon two others who "were best suited for the job." While the court declined to rule that such a 
selection process amounted to bad faith, it did venture that "[ilt cannot . . . be the best practice to 
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D. Deliberate Control Mechanisms 
Structural biases are not the only corrupting elements at work in the 
special committee. The integrity of the special committee's decision 
making may be compromised by the deployment of deliberate control 
mechanisms. A special committee, a creature of the board, has only the 
authority the board has delegated." Limitations on the sphere of author- 
have the interested CEO in effect handpick the members of the Special Committee . . . ." Id., 
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP. L. at 720. 
Whether such structural biases should impeach a board decision has been debated (at least in 
the shareholder litigation context and most often has been resolved in favor of the directors). See 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); see also Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule 
and shareholder Derivotive Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 BUS. LAW. 27 (1981); Cox, Searching for the 
Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapat0 and ALZ Pmject, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 959; Elfin, An Evaluation of a New Trend in Corporate Law: Dismissal of Derivative Suits by 
Minority Board Committees, 20 AM. BUS. L.J. 179 (1982); Note, A Proceduml Treatment of Deriva- 
tive Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALIF. L.REv. 885 (1981); Note, Zopoto Corp. v. MaI- 
donado: Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule - A  Ship without a Rudder?, 19 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 189 (1982); Note, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule to Dismiss Shareholder 
Derivotive Suits Againsr Directors, 33 U .  FLA. L. REV. 589 (1981); Note, Special Litigation Commit- 
teex An Unwelcome Solution to Shareholders Demands, 1981 U .  ILL. L. REV. 485. 
However, there appears a trend away from automatic deference to these committees' decisions 
on the basis that such structural bias is a significant factor affecting the integrity of a committee's 
decision. The case of Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987), followed this movement. 
The shareholders commenced a derivative suit alleging fraud, selfdealing and mismanagement by 
certain directors. In response, the board appointed a special committee to investigate the allegations 
and make recommendations on the proper course to follow. It recommended that two claims be 
settled and all others dismissed. Acting in accordance with the recommendations, the board a p  
proved a settlement covering the two claims and moved for summary judgment on the others. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the North Carolina Business Corporation Act 
retlected a policy adopted by the legislature favoring minority shareholders and shareholders' deriva- 
tive actions. As such, the statute precluded the termination of shareholder derivative actions with- 
out court approval. In this regard, the court would conduct an independent inquiry into the merits 
of the recommendation to determine whether the directors by their special litigation committees had 
met their burden of proof. 
Further, the court noted: 
[a] growing concern about the deficiencies inherent in a rule giving great deference to the 
decisions of a corporate committee whose institutional symbiosis with the corporation nec- 
essarily affects its ability to render a decision that fairly considers the interests of plaintiffs 
forced to bring suit on behalf of the corporation. 
Id. at 469, 358 S.E.2d at 326. 
In light of these deficiencies, the court refused a slavish application of the business judgment 
rule. Instead, while the board may appoint a special litigation committee to decide whether to termi- 
nate a shareholder derivative suit, such a determination would not be binding upon the court. In- 
stead, the court would make a fair assessment of the report of the special committee, along with all 
the facts and circumstances in the case, in order to determine whether the directors will be able to 
show that the transaction complained of was just and reasonable for the corporation. Accordingly, 
the case was remanded in order for plaintiffs to 
develop and present evidence on th[e] issue . . . that, in fact, false and/or incomplete infor- 
mation was supplied to the committee because of the nonadversarial way in which it gath- 
ered and evaluated information, and therefore . . . in light of these and other problems 
which arise from the structural bias inherent in the use of board-appointed special litiga- 
tion committees, that the committee's decision with respect to the litigation eviscerates 
plaintiffs' opportunities as minority shareholders to vindicate their rights under North Car- 
olina Law. 
Id. at 473, 358 S.E.2d at 328. 
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1988). 
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ity delegated, the scope of the assignment and the flow of information to 
the committee are devices that have successfully circumscribed the deci- 
sion making of special  committee^.^' 
E. Delegation to Outside Advisors 
While the common law limits on the power of the board to delegate 
authority to executive committees of directors are not settled, the limits 
of delegable duties are most clearly defined in cases involving outsiders.72 
In order for such a delegation to be legally enforceable the delegation 
must not involve surrender or abdication by the board of its statutory 
duty to manage.73 Where the duties left to the board after delegation are 
only unimportant, ministerial acts, the delegation is improper.74 
Many committees studied here relied upon financial advisors to de- 
termine the fairness of an offering price.75 In several cases the special 
71. In Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), the special committee, com- 
posed of outside directors appointed to consider a management buyout proposal, failed to request 
any comparative analysis of the management's proposal, read the pertinent document, or order fair- 
ness opinions and communicate with the principal of the proposing group. Nevertheless, the com- 
mittee recommended the proposal. See id. at 885-86. 
In Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Litig., 567 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Del. 1989), the special committee was 
specifically directed not to engage in a search for alternative transactions to a management buyout 
proposal. 
In I n  re Trans World Airlines, No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 870 (1989), the members of the two person special committee understood their responsi- 
bility to be very limited; that it did not include any negotiation with the merger offeror, that negotia- 
tion was the function of investment advisors and that it was not their intent to get the highest price 
possible. The court stated: 
[Tlhe special committee did not supply an acceptable surrogate for the energetic, informed 
and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an arm's-length adver- 
sary. . . . [Tlhe burden-shifting effect [of the business judgment rule] will not occur where 
the special committee did not adequately understand its function - to aggressively seek to 
promote and protect minority interests - or was not adequately informed about the fair 
value of the firm and the minority shares in it. 
Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  CORP. L. at 884. 
In Rosmon v. Shoe-Town, No. 9483, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 3638), 
the special committee was asked to decide a management leveraged buyout proposal of a company 
which had a history of going private, then public, then private again with little benefit to the inves- 
tors. It appeared that several directors had been active participants in these maneuvers. The special 
committee was instructed not to be concerned with price and the investment advisors hired by the 
board never expressed an opinion on the price expected. In the court's view, the formality of setting 
up a committee was only the beginning of the director's burden in such cases. 
72. H. BALLANTINE, supm note 21, at 134-35. 
73. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 
U.S. 893 (1930). 
74. Id. at 592. See o h  Fournier v. Fournier, 479 A.2d 708, 712 (R.I. 1984) (too broad a 
delegation, express or implied, may be interpreted as an unlawful abdication by the board of its 
management functions); Lane v. Bogert, 116 N.J. Eq. 454, 174 A. 217 (1934) (while directors may 
delegate they may not abdicate authority); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 
157, 173, 260 P.2d 823, 832-33 (1953) (while the board may grant authority to act it cannot delegate 
its function to govern). 
75. See, e.g., in re Envirodyne Indus. Shareholders Litig., No. 10702, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 
1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 175 (1990); In re Trans World Airline Shareholders Litig., 
No. 9844, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 870 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
See also DeMott, supra note 32, at 545. The author states: 
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committee directed the advisors to negotiate the terms of the buyout.76 
This complete reliance upon outside advisors to negotiate the terms of 
the proposal, to determine the fairness of the offer and even to determine 
whether to sell the corporation, seems a complete delegation of board 
powers. 
To be sure, the referral of some decisionmaking tasks to outsiders is 
necessary in the evaluation of a tran~action.'~ However, the ostensible 
impartiality and detachment of outsiders meets neither the obligations of 
directors nor the corporation's ends. Directors must be advocates, pro- 
moting the corporation, protecting its interests and refraining from con- 
duct injurious to the corp~ra t ion .~~ As agents or employees of the board 
or committee, outside advisors serve and are accountable to their em- 
ployers - the management that hired them.79 Their perspectives and 
orientation are necessarily limited and skewed.'O 
In a rough sense, the [fairness] opinion, if it is based upon a thoughtful assessment of 
relevant non-public information about the wmpany, is a surrogate for full disclosure to 
both the shareholders and the market generally, as a basis on which to assess the adequacy 
of the price being offered. Although fairness opinions appear more rather than less credible 
if the investment banker giving the opinion is not compensated on an outcomecontingent 
basis, generally investment bankers' fees in this connection are larger if the opinion asserts 
that the transaction is fair and smaller if the opinion asserts that the price offered is finan- 
cially inadequate. "Inadequacy" or unfairness opinions cost less than "fairness" or ade- 
quacy opinions because part of the fee is in effect an insurance premium against the risk of 
litigation against the investment bank. If the banker concludes that the proposed price is 
inadequate, it is likely that either the transaction will not occur, or if it occurs, a higher 
price will be offered. Non-transactions are inherently less conducive to litigation than 
transactions, and thus require less of an insurance premium. 
Id. 
76. For example, in In re Trans World Airlines Shareholders Litig., No. 9844, slip op. (Del. 
Ch. Oct 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. COUP. L. 870 (1989), the two members of the special 
committee believed that negotiation was the task of the financial advisor. 
In Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261 @el. 1989), only the financial advisors had direct contact with 
the bidders. In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), the 
board accepted without question the advice of its financial advisor that the prices offered were 
"within the range of fair value," although the financial advisor had not in fact calculated a range of 
fairness. Id. at 271. 
77. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986). 
78. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1955). The court stated: 
[qulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or 
fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes upon a director an affirm- 
ative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing informa- 
tion of the type and under the circumstances present here. 
Id. at 872. 
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 8 387 (1958): "Unless otherwise agreed, an 
agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters 
connected with his agency." 
80. See In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 
1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  COUP. L. 699 (1989). Out of fear that a temporarily depressed stock 
price might render the company particularly vulnerable to a takeover attempt, senior management 
met with the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley for advice concerning possible steps to 
protect shareholders from the perceived threat. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J .  COUP. L. at 705-06. 
Morgan Stanley had been engaged on a number of occasions in recent years to give investment 
banking advice or services to the wmpany. The investment banker prepared a written report of 
alternatives available including recapitalization, share repurchase, spin-off and a leveraged buy-out. 
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V. ABUSE OF THE SPECIAL C O M M I ~ E E  D VICE 
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. the forces of self-inter- 
est proved irresistible and revealed the pretensions of the special 
committee. 
In May 1987, certain members of senior management,82 concluding 
that Macmillan was a likely target of unsolicited takeover bids, "began 
exploring various defensive measures, including a [complete] corporate 
restructuring of the company."83 In all measures it was a central concept 
that these same members of management would emerge with absolute 
control of the company.84 Management's prediction of unsolicited bids 
came true as they were confronted with a takeover proposal by Robert 
M. Bass [Bass].85 
Management began meetings with the investment banking firm of 
Lazard, Freres & Co. [Lazard], which was later retained by the special 
committee as its advisor.86 Previously, Lazard had advised senior man- 
agement on other matters for over 500 hours. The special committee was 
not told of Lazard's previous contractual relationship with manage- 
ment.87 The committee was further advised by the financial advisors, 
Wasserstein, Perella [Wa~serstein].~~ 
Lazard valued the Macmillan stock at $72.57 per share on a pre-tax 
basis, but advised the special committee directors that it found the re- 
structuring price of $64.15 to be fair. Lazard also recommended rejec- 
tion of the $64 Bass offer as "inadeq~ate."~~ "On the Special 
Committee's recommendation, the Macmillan board adopted the man- 
agement restructuring [plan] and rejected the Bass offer. The committee, 
however, had not negotiated any aspect of the transaction with 
Morgan Stanley indicated that it would be interested in participating with management in a lever- 
aged buy-out. Id., reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 706. Their self-interest revealed, the report 
might have been rejected or at least viewed with a measure of skepticism. Instead, management 
teamed up with the corporation's long-time associate to pursue their mutual self-interest. Although 
the court criticized the manner in which the special committee was selected, it nevertheless denied 
relief. Id. at 718-27. 
81. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
82. This group included the chairman, chief executive officer, president, chief operating officer, 
and the chief financial officer. Id. at 1265. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Management decided in February or  March to establish a special committee to consider 
management's restructuring plan to fend off Bass. Id. at 1267. 
86. Id. at 1268. 
87. Id. at 1267-68. In addition, Evans invited a law firm to attend and the committee retained 
the firm. Id. 
88. Id. at 1270. 
89. Id. at 1270. Wasserstein valued Macmillan between $63 and $68 per share and also recom- 
mended rejecting the Bass offer. Id. 
Heinonline - -  18 W. St. U. L. Rev. 176 1990-1991 
1990lSPECIAL COMMITTEES I N  MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS 177 
management. "") 
Bass raised its bid to $73.91 Lazard advised the board that it could 
furnish an "adequacy" opinion that would enable the special committee 
to reject the Bass offer." Accordingly, Lazard concluded that the Bass 
offer was inadequate, given Lazard's earlier opinion that the "pre-tax" 
value of the company was between $72 and $80 per share.93 Wasserstein 
concurred.94 
Once again, on the special committee's recommendation, the board 
rejected the revised Bass offer and reaffirmed its approval of the manage- 
ment restructuring plan.95 Management was unable to consummate the 
transaction only because of a successful motion for a preliminary injunc- 
tion filed by Bass.96 
Undaunted, senior management then began extensive discussions 
with Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts [KKR], investment bankers, in an at- 
tempt to develop defensive measures to thwart the Bass offer, including 
discussions on a management-sponsored buyout of the ~ompany.~' Rob- 
ert Maxwell [Maxwell] then entered the fray and proposed to the chair- 
man a consensual merger between Macmillan and Maxwell at an all-cash 
bid of $80 per share, which was $5 higher than any other outstanding 
offer for the company.98 
Although on May 30, both Wasserstein and Lazard had given opin- 
ions that the management restructuring plan, with a price of $64.15 per 
share, was fair and on June 7, had advised the board that the company 
had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share, they both issued revised 
opinions on August 25, that an $80 per share offer was unfair and 
i nadeq~a t e .~~  
p~ - - - 
90. Id. 





96. Id. The vice-chancellor held both revised Bass offers "were clearly superior to the restruc- 
turing" and the only real threat posed by the Bass offers was to the incumbency of the board or to 
the "management group's expectations of garnering a 39% ownership interest [in the company] on 
extremely favorable terms." Id. 
97. Id. at 1272. 
98. Id. After more than three weeks of silence from the board, Maxwell made an $80 per share, 
all-cash tender offer for Macmillan. Id. 
99. Id. at 1272-73. Accordingly, the Maxwell bid was rejected. Macmillan and KKR met to 
negotiate and finalize the management-sponsored buyout. At the same time Macmillan's financial 
advisors were instructed by management to notify the remaining potential bidders to submit their 
best and final bids within 2 days. Thereafter, in a meeting with Maxwell the chairman of Macmillan 
announced that the company's management planned to recommend a management-KKR leveraged 
buyout to the directors of Macmillan and that he would not consider Maxwell's outstanding offer 
despite Maxwell's stated claim that he would pay "top dollar" for the entire company. The chair- 
man stated further that he would only discuss the possible sale of up to $750 million worth of assets 
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Several rounds of bidding followed. loo When the Maxwell all-cash 
bid reached $89 and the KKR mixed bid $89.50 ($82 in cash and the 
balance in subordinated securities), the two financial advisors concluded 
that the offers were too close to call.1o1 On the last evening of bidding, 
KKR submitted a final revised bid with a face value of $90 per share 
(higher than the last Maxwell bid). lo' Both financial advisors agreed that 
the KKR bid was higher and the special committee recommended ac- 
ceptance of the KKR offer.lo3 The board adopted the res~lut ion . '~~ 
The result of this case was stated in the beginning of this essay. It 
was clear from the record that the board's conduct failed all basic stan- 
dards of fairness. The court held that although the board was aware of 
its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the auction, the 
directors wholly delegated the creation and administration of the auction 
to an array of the chairman's handpicked investment advisors.lo5 The 
decisionmaking process was "clandestinely and impermissibly skewed" 
in favor of the management-sponsored bid, which received significant 
material advantages to the exclusion and detriment of other bidders in 
order to "stymie, rather than enhance, the bidding process. 9,106 fie 
to Maxwell in order to facilitate the management-sponsored buyout and that senior management 
would leave the company if any other bidder prevailed over the management sponsored buyout offer. 
During the bidding process and despite its repeated requests Maxwell was not given complete infor- 
mation until almost two months after such data had been furnished to KKR. Id. at 1273. 
100. Id. at 1273-74. 
101. At this point, the chairman called KKR and tipped Maxwell's bid. Id. at 1275. The com- 
mittee set up procedures for a final round of bidding. Wasserstein prepared a "script" to be read 
over the telephone to both bidders. While the prepared script was read to Maxwell, in the call to 
KKR Wasserstein and other financial advisors impressed upon KKR "the need to go as high as 
[KKR] could go" in terms of price. Id. at 1276. 
102. Id. at 1276. While Macmillan continued to negotiate with both parties over different mat- 
ters it never suggested to Maxwell that KKR had topped Maxwell's last bid. Id. 
In turn for raising its bid to $90.05 KKR succeeded in winning other important concessions 
from Macmillan including the sale to KKR of certain assets which would immediately result in a 
$250 million current tax liability for Macmillan. This liability could have been avoided through an 
installment basis sale of the assets, but as structured it operated as a de facto poison pill. Id. at 1277. 
103. Id. at 1277. 
104. Id. at 1277-78. On the same day Robert Maxwell delivered a letter to Evans announcing 
that he had amended his cash tender offer to $90.25 per share, conditioned upon invalidation of the 
KKR lockup agreement. In his letter Maxwell emphasized that he had previously stated his willing- 
ness to top any offer higher than his earlier $89 offer. Id. 
On October 4, the Macmillan board met to consider both the revised Maxwell bid and Evans' 
"tip" to KKR. After some discussion and deliberation the board rejected Maxwell's increased offer 
because it was conditioned on invalidating the KKR lockup. Furthermore, the board considered 
that the "tip" to KKR was immaterial in light of the second round of bidding that occurred. In 
addition, after consultation with counsel, the board concluded that their ignorance of this "tip" at 
the time they approved the merger with KKR was insufficient grounds for repudiating the lockup 
agreement. Id. at 1278. 
105. Id. at 1281. 
106. Id. In particular, the "negotiations" with Maxwell were noteworthy only for the peremp 
tory and curt attitude of Macmillan through its chairman. Maxwell was deliberately misled by the 
advisors and subjected to a series of short bidding deadlines in a seeming effort to prevent the sub- 
mission of a meaningful bid. Id. at 1281-82. 
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court concluded: 
Normally decisions of a board based upon [opinions or reports of of- 
ficers and other experts selected with reasonable care] will not be dis- 
turbed when made in the proper exercise of business judgment. 
However, when a board is deceived by those who will gain from such 
misconduct, the protections girding the decision itself vanish. Deci- 
sions made on such a basis are voidable at the behest of innocent par- 
ties to whom a fiduciary duty was owed and breached, and whose 
interests were thereby materially and adversely affected.''' This rule 
is based on the unyielding principle that corporate fiduciaries shall ab- 
jure every temptation for personal profit at the expense of those they 
serve. lo8 
This ruling seems to answer the central inquiry of this paper - con- 
stituted as humanity is, the special committee fails as a device to ensure a 
proper resolution of a conflict between duty and self-interest. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Macmillan, the court found that because the proponents of the 
management buyout had failed to disclose all relevant information and 
had engaged in other acts in a deliberate attempt to thwart the board's 
duty to enhance shareholder wealth, the decision was disqualified from 
the normal standards of deference due under the business judgment 
rule.lW It seems that the result in this case was correct, but the stated 
issue too narrow. The real issue needing resolution was whether, as a 
general proposition, special committees are fit to treat transactions 
tainted with self-interest. The cases reveal inherent deficiencies in the 
selection and composition of members such that honest, dispassionate 
decisionmaking is impossible. Even when committee members are other- 
wise well-meaning, the cases show they can be hoodwinked by a deter- 
mined group of self-dealing managers. It is little comfort that some 
courts, such as the Macmillan court, eventually vindicate the rights of 
107. The court explained: 
In this context, we speak only of the traditional concept of protecting the decision itself, 
sometimes referred to as the business judgment doctrine. The question of the independent 
directors' personal liability for these challenged decisions, reached under circumstances 
born of the board's lack of oversight, is not the issue here. However, we entertain no doubt 
that this board's virtual abandonment of its oversight function in the face of [the manage- 
ment bidders'] patent self-interest was a breach of its fundamental duties of loyalty and 
care in the conduct of this auction . . . ." 
Id. at 1284 n.32 (citation omitted). 
108. Id. at 1284. The court went on to discuss whether the directors' had met their "enhanced 
duty" of loyalty in responding to a potential shift in control and whether the lockup agreement was 
valid. The duty was not met and the decision of the directors granting the lockup option was neither 
informed nor disinterested. As such, it was not protected by the business judgment rule. Id. (foot- 
note omitted). 
109. Id. at 1287-88. 
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shareholders because interim costs (corporate resources used to plan, ef- 
fectuate and defend the appropriation) are great and irretrievable. More- 
over, there is a more fundamental cost in the loss of shareholder control. 
In these schemes, the power to decide on actions which will bring about 
irrevocable consequences is removed from persons loyal to the enterprise 
and given to those who have subordinated themselves to their own self- 
interest or to outsiders who have never pledged any loyalty to the corpo- 
ration or the shareholders. The locus of corporate decisionmaking thus 
shifts. In that shift, shareholders are wholly excluded from the corporate 
process. 
In normal business decisions directors have discretion and their 
honest and informed judgments require deference. Self-dealing transac- 
tions, however, warrant greater court scrutiny. While a standard method 
for evaluating such transactions may facilitate intelligent adjudications, a 
set of procedures which ensures only a cursory review of self-dealing 
transactions as to procedural fairness only encourages management com- 
promise. As long as the use of the special committee can be set up as 
conclusive (or even rebuttable) evidence of fairness, a director need not 
avoid plans which conflict with the interests of the corporation. Instead, 
he will find it profitable to curb his ideas, energies and commitment until 
shareholders have been eliminated and the corporation is his alone. In- 
deed, his office as a fiduciary affords him the means - information, fi- 
nancial resources and business relationships - by which to accomplish 
his coup (not only in practical aspects, but in sustaining his burden dur- 
ing a challenge in ~ou r t ) . ' ' ~  To accord business judgment rule protection 
to a decision by a corporation's fiduciaries in these situations seems 
perverse. 
It is necessary to import substantive considerations into the evalua- 
tion of conflict of interest questions. This can be accomplished by al- 
lowing directors no choice between self-interest and duty. An absolute 
rule prohibiting directors from proposing self-interested buyouts is 
required. ' 
110. See genemlly Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 
1354 (1978). 
11 1. This writer is not the first to call for an absolute prohibition on management buyouts. See 
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 110, at 1367-68, 1376 (advocating prohibition on all going private 
transactions). 
See also Demott, supra note 32. The author considers the various policy alternatives for ad- 
dressing management buyouts including absolute prohibition. She argues that while a categorical 
ban presents serious problems of definition, "[i]f the principle interest to be served by the directors is 
that of the company's shareholders, directors should not be free to ensure that the transaction spon- 
sored by management and its allies will trump competing bids." Id. at 554. DeMott proposes per- 
mitting management groups to bid, but restricted from structuring any such transaction so that 
public equity is entirely eliminated. Id. at 555. In addition, she proposes that there be a requirement 
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that the fact of the management proposal be publicly announced coupled with a requirement that 
non-public information equivalent to that given the management group be made available to other 
prospective bidders, who could in turn be required to agree to treat the information received as 
confidential. Id. at 556. 
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